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"THE TRANSITIONAL PERIOD: MASSIVE RESISTANCE AND NORFOLK,

On Hay 17, 1954, Justice Harlan's lone dissent of the

11

V~."

separate-

but-equal" doctrine lnid down in the rimjority opinion of P:l;essy v.
Ferguson (18ltG)

bec~mc the

lmr of the lnm1.

'T'he Supreme Court, under

Chief Justice .E<lrl \-.'arren, unanimously :::truck dm·m "legal:iized"
segreg<:i.~tion

The landmark

in public schools in Brotvn v. Bonrd of Education of Topeka.
case

sparked

a

nm: era of racial relations, cutting

deeply into the fabric of Southern trndHions and prejudices.

The

Southern States, especially Virginia, had to conie·to grips with a
seemingly ovcruhclming dilemmn-- to enforcc the Supreme Court ruling
or fie;ht for a Southern "tradition"-- the scc;regation of the races.
Virginia decided to fight for
school education.

~.states'

Through a program of

right to oversee public
m~ssive

resistance, Norfolk

became a pawn in the struge;le to maintain segregated schools.
Before the Brovm decision in i951f, the

11

sep::i.rate-but-equal 11

doctdne had been abolished in the aren of gre.duate and professionnl
schooJ.s.

The .'3upreme Court by 1950 had ruled unconstitutional two

devices used by .Southern Stutes to promote segregation in the universities.

In Mississippi, the case of I,loyd Gaines '"'as instrumental

in outlawins scholarshi1)s for blacks to out-of-state schools because
they uere not the .same, .. as furnishing- equal facilLti.os.

1

Jn Sweatt v.

Painter (1950), the court ruled that in no vay could a three room law
school be equal to the law school c.t the University of Texas.

Further-

more, in the case of George licLawin, the court ruled if a school
ndnitted n necro student, he was eligible for the same rights and
pri viler,es rn otlter students.

2

Therefore, by 1950 the groundwork was

laid for outlmd.ng segregation in the public schools.

2

In 1952, the Supreme Court was asked to consider the NAACP's
challenge of scgrer,atctl public schools.
rendering
Johm

\v.

a'l'l

The court adjourned without

opinion and called for rcnrgumentation in the 1953 term.

Davie prc.sented the statcG' case, declnring uncler the consti-

tution that the states had a right to regulate public schools without
federal interference, and relied heavily upon Plessy v. Ferguson as
precedent for segrcgntion. 3

Thurgood !·br.shall, arguing the case for

integration, stated that the writers of the fourteenth amendment's
intent was to outlaw segregation.

Also, segregation itself had a

detrimental effect upon both black and white children.

lt

On ~fay 17, 1951f, when the ::>upreme Court lw.nded dm-rn its opinion,

it used '.rhurgood ITarshall' s arguments on the importance of education
as a major function of state and local government:
" ••• Compulsory school attendence laws and the grent expenditure for education both dcmonstrv.te our recognition of
the iffportance or education to our democratic society •••••
it is doubtful any child may rea.sonably be expected to
succeed in life if he is denied an opportunity, where the
states have undertaken to provide it, is ~ right that must
be mnde nvailablc to all on equal terms."
After stating the "equal terms" policy, the court used it to invalidate separate facilities because they denied Negro children
"cqup_l educational opportunities. 11

The tribunal, using the same lines

of reasoning, dealt uith racial aspects.of scgreeation, stating,
11 • • •

'.i'o separate them (Negroes) from others of similar age and

qualifications soley because of their rnce generates a feeling of
inferiority as to their statlis in the community that may affect their
hearts and minds in a way tmlikely ever to be undone. 11 6 The inevitable
conclusion by the court was• " ••• that in the field of public education
the doctrine of' sepa:rate.~_but-equal' has no place ••• 117

because it

3

denied Negroes the equal protection of the laws guaranteed by the
foui-teenth amendment. At the end of the opinion, the court asked that
the interested parties submit briefs on the implementation of its
ruling.
In one clean swift blow, the Supreme Court overturned Plcssy v.

Ferguson.

Knowine; the importance of ib> ruling, the court presented

a firm,. united stand.'against segregation by being unanimous.

Also,

the court postponed ruling on the implementation of its decision to

8
h oping
.
t o s t ave o ff exp1 osivc
.
.
a 11 ow f or re fl ec t Jon,
s1• t ua t.ions.
Th~.Supreme

Court had acted, and it \-:as up to the states to react.

Considering the implications of Brown, the immediate reactions
of state leaders tended to be rather mild.

For instance, Dr. Dowell

J. Howard, the State Superintendent of Public Instruction in Virginia

stated that

11

•••

there will be no defiance of the Supreme Court decision

.

as far as I'm concerned ••• We are trying to teach school children the
law of the land and we will abide by it ••• Vi;rginia has always taken care
of her problems and I think still has the ability. 119

One reason be-

hind the mild response was the delay of implementation of desegregation.

Virginia's Governor Stanley reflected:

"Now it. ap.Pears assured

the decision of the Supreme Court will not caff.ect. the public schools
during the term. opening nm.-t
. fall, we shall have time to give full
a,nd careful consideration to means arriving at an acceptable solution. 1110
(underlin~ng

author).

Southern States, including Virginia, saw a

means of at least delaying compliance indcfinately, if not stopping
it.

J.J. Brewbaker, r!orfolk's Superintendent of schools statement on

-

Brown embodies. the attitudes of most of Virginia, "· •• We should accept

4

the decision calmly and not let our emotions get.·.in':the way· •of planning for the de\rclopments ahead.

It must be done intellectually rather

than emotionally ••• \le feel that it will be 1960 before the ruling will
become fully effective.

This is a favorable factor.

Gradual changes

nre of course hotter thun sudden ones ••• 'l'he :;uprcmc Court intended i \;
to be that way. 1111
Of.course, not all Southern leadern responded as calmly as those
in Virginia.

Some officials vfolentl:y opposed

the idea of segre-

gation, such as Governor Talmadge of Georgia: " ••• 'there will never
be mixed schools \·;hile I am Governor' and warned that school intogration would lead to "bloodshed.' "

12

The stage was set far the

confrontation of the past (racial segregation) with the doctrine ,

racial integration.
The second Brown case deciding on the method of implementation
was released in 1955·

In essence, the opinion gave Southern states a

"reasonable" amount of time to begin integration of public schools;
11 • • •

the (district) courts will require that the defendents make a

pronpt and reasonable start toward full cor.1pliance with our May 17,

1954 ruling. 1113 But, tbe court qualified its statement with "once
such a start (toward integration) has been made, the courts may find
that additional time is necessary to carry out the ruling in an
.

111

effective iw.nner. 11 . _

The Southern legislators seized the second

Br01-m decid on~ as a chance to legally stall integration.
In the hluck perspective, the first Brown opinion was a great
one, but the second vras a great mistake.

Blacks felt that the notion

of deferring the exercise of a con::.ti tuti.onal right \'las a by-product

5

of the earlier attempts by Southern states to hold fost to segregation
in graduate and professional schools until they had time to construct
separate-but-equnl focilities. 15 Negroes had already won the battle
for integration of: graduate nnd professional schools, and Hith the
first Brmm case had won the battle for integration of public
schools.
won the

i\ftcr the second Brown decision, blacks found they
ba~

h~d

but had just begun to ficht the wnr n8ainst massive

resistance.
On August

30, i95Lf, Governor Stanle;{ Hp:pointed \·1hat was to be-

come lmm,'11 as the Gray Cor.:mission (nc:.med after the chnirman, Garland
Gray), to stud;:r possible courses of action after the Bro1m ruling.
During the Commission's

fourtecn-monu~

r1pliberntion, public sen ti-

ments ai:;ainst integration began to harden, due mostly to an organization l:noun as the Defenders of State SovereiBnty and Individual
Liberties.

The Defenders were a major force in mobilizing pro-

segregationist support by sponsoring rallies and providing speakers
for public meetings.

16 Due to the Defender's activities, the issue

was kept before Virginians, gaining more and more support for a
hard line stand agninst integration.
The Gray Commission revealed a three-point plan dealing with
segregation on November 12, 1955.

First, the program would empower

local school boards to assign pupils to schools for various reasons
excent race.

The boards would be able to avert, minimize or even

})OSsibly allou se,sregation \·rith its placement decisions.

Secondly,

the stnte \·mulcl provide tuition grants from public funds for private
schooling ,.fi.1crc public schools heel closed rnther than be integrated,

6

or if parents chose not to send children to integrated schools.
Lastly, the legislature would nmend attendence lm·rs so that no child
would be compelled to attend integrated schools. 17
On November 7, 1955, the Sup.rcmc Court of /tppcals of Virginia, on

the basis of section 141 of the Virginit'I constitution declared unconstitutional tuition grants using public funds for war orphans in
Almond '{. Day.

18

~['here fore,

the constitution ha cl to be amended before

the Gray plnn co1Lld be put into effect.

The General Assembly favored

the Grny plan n.nu quickly voted to hold a state-wide referendum on
January 9, 1956 to decide if a constitutional convention should be
held.
While the General fl.sseinbly dealt with the Gray plan, James J.
Kilpatrick, the editor of the Richmond News Leader launched an
amazingly successful editorial campaign \·rhich ultimately undermined
the conciliatory stance of the commission.

He popularized the use

of "interposition and nullification" to combat the Supreme Court
using the Virginia and Kentucky·resolutions plus the writings of
Spencer Roe.ne and Calhoun as a basis for his argurnents. 1 9 The
interpositionists claimed the Supreme Court in the BrOi·m opinion
amended the constitution, n power ,.,hi ch rests with the legislature
or three-fourths of the states.

Since the fiupreme Court could not

amend the constitution, the Court's own action wo.s unconstitutional.
.

. 20

Therefore the Bro'l'm decision was invalJ.d.

Kilpatrick went as far

as to suggest the Assembly adopt a proposal for interposition and
nullification 311d actnally the

resolu~ion

itself in an editorial.

Host ,people knew interposition and nullification in the past, and

7

did not seriously think it would work, but saw it as more of a protest
to tre Federal Government and the Suprer.1e Court.

State Senator Armistid

L. Boothe dismissed interposition as a defensive weapon, :paying

11

'that

interesting theory' had been disppsed of by the great Chief Justice
(Narshall) in HcCulloch v. I·!nryland. 1121 Dcspite the wealrness of the
doctrine, the General Assembly adopted a limited form of interposition
on Februrary 1, 1956.

'l1he interest interposition caused was a sign

Virginia wasn't ready to comply uith the Federal government on integration and was still trying.to find ways to fight it that went beyond the Grny plan.
If interposition was a hint at the course Virginia would take
against desecration, the referendum vote and conclusions drawn from it
was a sure sign of an oncoming fight with the Federal government.

In

a heavy turnout for a cold .January day, the mvrgin was two-to .... one in
favor of the constitutional convention.

Virginia's Attorney General

I,indsay Almond \·ms "highly elated," saying the decision was "the
necer;sary first step toward a solution of the tragic dilemma in which
we find ourselves ••• 1122 (underlining author's).

The Byrd forces,which

in essence ran politics in Virginia, hailed the outcome of the referend.um as a mandate for total resistance, and by early 1956 had begun
to· ·move beyond the Gray plan proposals to a hard line of protest. 23
Norfoll:'s vote in the referendum

(l~,519

for and l0,36o against),

reflected the voters' were not as sure of resistance
the state.

<"S

the rest of

Before the referendum the Hiclunond Times-Dispatch' s

George H. Kelley reported on the chances of it in the second Congressional

8

district, stating:
" The voters and the campaigners are talking one thing,
the effect of the Gray Commission's proposals on public
schools. The city (Norfolk) votes which dominate the district \rill be i:;on or lost on this fnctor.
The initial impact of the Gray commission's tuition
grant plan was that th . . schools, as the city now knows
them, might be hurt. The proconvcntion forces hnvo had to
make an uphill fight to dispell this f ecling. They say the
task is not hopeless; thcy;rc
not co11ccdinr; the district to
1
thee' anti-convention camp. 11 'Virginia \"vas gearing up to battle segregation and its largest city
was Havering.
After the reforendun vote, Virginia was noodod with ideas to
check integration altogether.

Through the spring and summer of 1956

the South fought for control over its puhlic schools.

The struggle

had turned from segregntion itself to a crusade for state liberty.

On

August 27, 1956, Governor Stanley called a special session of the
General Assembly, and for a month, lesislators debated how best to
counter the .Supreme Court

decree~

25 The resolutions arising from the

session became knm-m as the Hassi ve Resistance laws.

The General

Assembly provided a Pupil Placement Board, n statewide agency with
pov:er to assign students to various schools and handle requests for

trrn1sfcr.

'l'he uccnc:r's t.1ctionc would keep thine::; ns they were, or

at least narrm·.' the scope of Brovm. Once a school received its final
order to integrate, the Governor uas required to seize and close the
school until it could be opened on a segr.ega-bed basis.
could not be

~c-opencd,

without state control.

If a school

the locality could open the school integrated
Also, tuition grnnts from public funds for

private schooling could be ha.d by pupil,s where the public schools had

9

been closed by the Governor. 26 '111e laws were designed to fie;ht off
integration and all Virginia needed Has n leader to put them into
effect:

Virginia found its leader i11 the 1957 CTubenatorial election

in Lindsay Almond, tl10 1'1-'n who become the force behind massive resistance.
The guvernatorial election of 1957 was a symbolic selection
between.total massive resistance and a more moderate stand for local
options and open schools.

Theodore Roosevelt (Ted) Dalton was a

powerful republican of high moral standard who fought hard in a
relatively close battle in
Thomas Stanley.

195~

against Byrd-machine candidate

He was the strongest throat to organizational

proteges in thirty years.

On the other side of the coin, J. Lindsay

Almond was the Attorney General and had been Prince Edward County's
lawyer before the Supreme Court.

Almond was a highly emotional

orator with the ability to reach the common man.

In 1957, the two

men squared off to battle for Vireinia's highest office.
Ted Dalton's position on the biggest isGue in the election
(integration) was one of moderation.

He thought Virginia's best

hope was in a local pupil placement board, similar to those instituted in Horth Carolina.

Seeing that integration was held to a

minimum, he felt Virginia would have a more defensible position in
court with token integration. 27 Dalton's main stumbling block was the
trouble in Little Rock, Arkansas.

Virginians were afraid that Pres-

ident Eisenhower would send troops into V:irginia to enforce any court
ordcrer1 inteeration.

The republican Dalton found it hard to defend

10

himself ngninst criticism of the rcpublicnn administration stating,
"the democratic opposition was trying ·to hold me hostage for the
I,i ttle. Rock school troubles, for the Supreme Court desegregation :.decision and for the Civil Hights 1egislntion before Coni:;ress ••• " 28
The democratic opponent, J. Lindsay f\lmon<l, wns a hard-line
segregationist, campaigning with ferocity against the NAACP, the

.

29

Supreme .Court, and the federal government. -

J\.lmond stressed the

Little Rock incident and promised the same for Virginia if Dalton was
elected.

Almond demanded massive resistance, but a '.'flexible positiontt

to meet each and every crisis as it arose, and "apply the best brnins
in Virginia"to devise new ,wq.ys ·to sta'Ve ·off integration.3°
At election time, massive resistance was at a peak and
Almond was given sixty-three per cent of the popular vote.

~dsay

Almond

saw his victory as a mandate for total massive resistance and called
upon the General Assembly in his inaugural address "to stand firm
with tmfailing unity of purpose and high resolve against eyery assault.
upon the sovereignty of this commonwcalth. 1131 Hith massive resistance
laws and a leader, Vir55.nia was ready to battle federal power for
segregated public schools.
During the sprint; and summer of 1958, five desegregation suits:
slowly went through the courts and were coming close to the final
order to integrate.

Prince

I~dward

County, Warren County, Charlottes-

ville, Arlington and Norfolk city seemed likely to receive orders to
inteerate by Septmember.

Yet in spite of all the agitation, relatively

few Virginians in the summer of 1958 grasped the fact that massive
resistance would actually boil do\'m to locking the doors of the public

11

schools. 32 Little did Virginia know the confrontation was just
around the corner.
The confrontation between federal and state supremacy came to a
city different from most in the south.

Although the population was

predominately southern, r.mny diverse elements from all over the
United States, and even the world resided in Norfolk.

The city was

blessed with a great natural harbor, the port of Hampton Roads, and
it drew four naval bases and the NATO command center to the area.33
Norfolk's rncial bci.lance was twenty-c;evcn per cent Negro to
seventy per cent Hhite, a negro population large enough to provide
leadership, but not so large as to be threatening.

For the largest

city in Virginia with a population of 330,000, the history of racial
relations was relatively good. Although the Negro was limited to the
lower to middle classes usually, Norfolk had more opportunities in
non-discriminatory jobs such as governmental service than in most
cities in the south.

It is true that there were separate schools,

beaches and bathrooms, but Norfolk tended to be more liberal in its
attitudes because of the diversity of population. 3 l~

Like most,

Horfolkians thought the Brmm decision would never affect their 't{ay
of life.

Little did they know but massive resistance was to come to

the city in the sultry August of 1958.
August in Norfolk was no different than in any other year.

School

clothes i·1ere bein~ advertised, high school football teams had started
practice :for fall 8.:\mes and the school bo.'.lrd Han preparing for ruiother
term.

I3ut the rumblings of massive resi1:;tancc were beginning to upset

plans for the coming school year.

In early August the Pupil Placement

12

Board (under the auspices of the Norfolk r;chool Board), was under
fire by Negro attorneys.

The lmeyers protested testing and interviewing

procedures set up by the city because tl1cy applied to negroes only.
The case was before the Fedcrnl district court under Judge Walter E.
Hoffman \·Jho reviewed applications after the board to see if the Neero
protests uere justified.
Apparently'. Norfolkfo.ns didn't seriously think the schools would
close in the 1958-59 term because private school enrollments had not
surpassed the previous year, but the increased inquiries into private
education did suc;ccst Norfolk ci t j zens were not completely blind to
the possibilities ··of closed schools. 35

Preparations for private

schooling uere being made by the Tidern:tter Educational

l~oundation,

Inc.,

but the organizstion could only accomodate between eight-hundred to
!J,ine:;.liundred ·pupils of' ·the ten-thousand \·thlch \"Jould be displaced by
school closings.

Host in the city thought legalities would keep the

cases tied- up in court for at least another year, and Iforfolk was
unprepared for the

possib~litJ:

of cloaed schools.

After a month-lone deliberation, the Pupil Placement Board denicd one hmidred-ruid "ffft:y.,.,one
on August 19, 1958.

n~gro

applications Tor· i-1hite: schoolis

The reason for denial ranged from incomplete

test procedures, hcnlth, ::>afety, trnnsportation nnd possible racial
3'7
strife involved. '

Under pressure from the district court, the Norfolk

Placement Board :::-eluctantly assigned and enrolled seventeen Hegre
children into \1hite schools.

Although the Board believed the assign-

men ts were contrnry to \·rhat it thought wer:-: tho "l1or.:t :i rit:erests'' of
the school children and general public, the Board felt it had no

13
choice in the matter.38
Other matters complicated the case in Norfolk.

Before the

Supreme Court was a case orii;inatint:; from Little Rock, Ar1'..ansas,
in which the Circuit Court of Appeals hacl granted a two-year delay
of integration.

Judge Hoffman stated he would allow a delay in

implementation in the Supreme Court allowed Little Hock the twoyear period·.

Norfolk school officials decided to delay school

opcnines until the decision was made on the Little

I~ock

case.

Norfolkians still hnd hope, but i t was fading fast.
The Supreme Court decided in Cooper v. A1'3ron (358 U.S. 1

1958) on September 12, 1958, that the second Drmm decision's
"integration with all deliberate speed" doctrine had been delayed
long enough, and desegration was to be implemented irnmediately.39
NorfoD'- officials sav the handwriting on the wnll and applied
for an injunction so that the state placement board's denial of
Hegro applications in their city would not be put into effect.
On Septenber 22, th-e da.y schools were to open in Norfolk, only
one j1mior high school (where no blacks had applied), and the
segrec;cted elemento.ry schools opened.

The rest of Norfolk's

schools:wcre closed by order of Virginia state law.

Massive

resistance had come to Iforfolk and the city was S'tunned.
Norfolk had one last ditch hope of delaying integration for
one more year, by appealing to the United States Fourth District
Court of Appeals to reverse Judge Hoffman's order.

If the re-

I

versal was granted, Norfolk would open the junior and scn.ior high
cchools affected by the integration order on September 29.

The

14
last hope for Norfolk schools died on September 23, when Judge
Simon Sobeloff of the Court of Appeals refused to stay the order
to desegregate:.

110

The schools were to stay closed, displacing

ten-thousand students who hnd to seek an education elsewhere or
forego school for an indefinite period.
After the school closings, pupils h3d few options open for
obtaining an education.

Students could go outside the City and

attend night clasnes, such as the ones offered in South Norfolk,
or to private schools within the state and sometimes out of state.
Some pupils went to live with relatives outside the Norfolk area
to attend schools in other districts on a tuition basis.

But

few parents could afford to send their children away, so they formed
"tutoring groups," asking teachers from the school system to head
the sessions.

Each student paid a fee to cover costs, usually

around five dollars a week.

As one teacher stated, tutoring groups

were "not a substitute for public education--we hope it is just
going to tide us over until something in done about public education. 1141

Tutoring groups varied in size from twenty to four-

hundred and were held in private homes, storefronts, offices or
churches.

One church-sponsored group ha<l four-hundred pupils

from the Horview area sign up and turned aw:i.y
for lack of space.

~mother

three-hundred

Church officials were careful to point out

that "the church is not recognizing mansive resistance but is
only recognizing the distress and dispair of the parents and
I

children."

4')
L

ifost

parents and children realized tutoring groups

were a .stop-gap effort with almost no chance for state a.ccreditation,

15

but felt some educntion was better than none at all.
The Tidewater Education Foundation headed by Jamen Hartin IV
had been working on plnns for private schooling since early summer,

1958.

The day after the schools closed, registration for Martin's

private schools increased dramatically.
tration day

covered~the

Student comments on regis-

-

spectrum of attitucles prevalent in the city. .

One student, Ruth Akers, stated that she didn't "care one way or the
other, just so I don't have to aGsocinte with them (Hcgroes). 11

On

the other hand, Jimmy Bolten said "I just wish they would open the
schools up.

It seems like it (integr<ition) has got to come sooner

or later. 114 3 Martin uas to open up his academies as soon as he
could negotiate with the Governor for relensing Norfolk's teachers
from their contracts and felt he "wouldn't hnvc any trouble" securing
their services upon their release.

1-1/1

Norfolk's school teachers surprised many by .refu::;ing to participate in the privvte schools set up by the Tidewater Education
Foundation.

An outraged Hartin accused the terichers of treachery

because the move deeply wounded the private rochool effort he had
helped plm1.

FN-iring that by suppr:irl: i.ng private schools, public

education in Norfolk might cease to exist.

On

October 2, the Norfolk

Education Association voted 487 to 89 in favor of a resolution
demanding the city of Norfolk to reopen secondary schools on a
seeregated basis if Governor Almond failed to restore them as a
sesregated syGtem. 45

The resolution read: "He as teacherr; are

deeply concerned ab.out public schools and feel that no system of
privnte schools or private tutoring groups can adequately replace

16

our public schools.

Hence we urge the immediate opening of the

closed schools so our children will not be penalized ••• 1146
Later in October, the N.E.A. voted to discontinue teaching
in tutoring groups by January 1 if the schools weren't opened.
Acting as a unified body, the teachers forced parents and civic
leaders to deal directly with the problem and not become complacent
because the children were receiving an education without schools.
Teachers were not the only people protesting the school situation:.

Hinistries became a moving force for open schools.

Sixty

Pastors of diffcrint; denomin[ltions petitioned the city: council
to open schools immediately.

Parents and the students themselves

flodded council and Governor Almond with petitions also.

The Haury

High School Student Cooperative Association's petition best stated
the reasons for opening the schools:
"No system of private education can ever take the
place of our school system for the following reasons:
1) The majority of families cannot afford·private schools
or tutoring classes.
2) The facilities are inadequate.

3) Proper supervision cannot be maintained.
4) The oppo~7unities for college entrance are drastically
reduced.
Even a member of the Norfolk School Board, Benjamin

added his voice to the mounting protests.

On October

J. Willis,

4, 1958, Mr.

Willis said he would rather have schools open with n minimum amount
of integration than see children denied an education.

Among his

reasons for publically annmmcing his belief was the reactions of

17

the children, the innocent victims of massive resistance:

11

I

have had any number of children come to me with tears in their
e;y-es ••• They all ask 'Isn't there something you can do, Mr. Willis?'
It brenks your heart to see a chilu plcnd for an cducation. 1148

The Norfolk City Council took the brunt of the protests.

By

September 30, Mayor Fred Duckworth and the Council were debating
the "pros and cons" of a referendum to learn the true
the populous on the school crisis.

f~eling

of

In late October, the council

decided to hold the referendum two weeks after the Senatorial election.
The referendum would ask if the council should petition the Governor
for the return of the public schools, but added at the bottom of the
ballot that there could be a tax increase to run the schools since
the state would automatically cut off funds to an integrated system. 49
The Norfolk Commitee for Public.Schools, an organization dedicated
to open public schooling integrated or not, protested the addition
to the ballot referring to taxes because the wording was "loaded."
rrhe Cammi tee twice tried to get nn injunction stopping the referendum and faileu. 50
The City Council watched hro importcnt elections in November,
the Senatorial rnce and the referendum.

On Hovember 4, 1958,

Senator Byrd rU1Uling on a platform endorsing masaive resistance
won re-election in the stntc seventy per cent and took
majority of the vote in Norfolk.

;:i,

large

Two weeks later, the vote was

three-to-two against petitioning ,the Governor for return of the
schools in the IJorfolk referendum.

The council felt the results

of the two elections was a mandate for further resistance, and
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Mayor Duckworth caid "the people have spoken.
·
t"ion ••• ,,sl
we can wi"th th e situa
~

We'll do the best

Some observers thought the vote

misleading because only 21,052 out of a population of 330,000
decided the fate of the schools.

Jn spite of the small munber of

voters, Norfolk City Council was resolved to toke an even harder
stand against integration.

By

late November, the douncil had

voted tQ take direct control of the school budget and appropriate
the money to operate schools on a month-to-month basis.

In essence,

the council lw.d the power to withola ftmding to the Black schools
still functioning, thereby closing them also.

Most people dis;,.

approved of the retaliatory move, even Governor Almond frowned
upon the council's ''cut-off the funds", measure. 52
Hhile protests were mounting, the Stnte and Federal Courts
became once again the battleground of segregntion.

In early Sep-

tember, the Governor instituted a friendly suit before the Virginia
Supreme Court of Appeals to test the validity of publically funded
tuition grants (Harrison v. Day).

Attorney General Harrison peti-

tioncd the court for a Wl'it of mandamus, ordering Comptroller Sidney
Day_to release funds for tuition grnnts.

The judges would then

rule on the constitutionality of the massive resistance lnws.53
Governor Almond hoped the Vircinia Court \·:ould be lenient in its
interpretation of the Virginia constitution nud allow the laws to
stand.
In late October, a group of Norfolk parents on behalf of their

children nci.r:ied J. I,indsay Almond as a defendant in a class-action
suit ained at re-opening the six closed schools claiming a violation
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r:4
of the fourteenth amendment (Jo.mes v. Almond) • .:.>

The suit was

unusual because it uas brought before the District Court by white
parents whereas in other areas the challenr,cs had been started by
the NAA.cP.

In addition, two other cases to open the schools had

been filed in the federal court,one by another group of white
parents, and one by the NAACP.

Areument~tion

for Ha.E_rison v.

Day and_James v. Almond wns set for mid-Hovcmber in both the federnl
and state courts.

December would be a month of waiting for the

opinions of the courts and the conclusion of the crisis.
January 1959 turned out to be n decisive month for school
desegregation iii' Norf'olk arrl:r the: state_··or· Virginia •.. Harrison. v.
Day and James v. Almond were before the courts nnd opinions would
be rendered around mid-month.

Two important influences on Norfolk,

the navy and prominant businessmen broke i:heir neutrality on the
segreeation issue nnd spoke out for open schools on an indirect
manner.

L"1. a press conference, President Eisenhower told the .

nation be thinking of opening schools on the naval bases of Norfolk,
1;1eaning the possible loss of federal impace funds which went to
school construction due to the influx of "nnval" children.55
Rumors were rampant after the

~·resident's

announcement and some went

as far as to predict the shut down of navul bases , which would
be a severe blow to the economy in Norfolk •
.i\.rea businessmen were nlso worried aboui: the effect of closed
schools on the economy.

M. W. Armistid III, president of the

Roanoke Times-World Corp. summed up the feelings of individual
businessmen in Virginia and especially Norfolk 1·1hen he stated:
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"No considerable plant is going to relocate in the Roanoke Valley
or anywhere in Virginia if there are no adequate mass educational
facilities.

Those who say otherwise either arc mistaken or they

are burying their heads in the sand. 1156
On January 16, 1959, cii:;hty-1rinc Norfolk residents filed
suit in the district court to block the city council's "cut-off
the funds" plan.

'l'hc council 1ms charged with engaging in a evasive

scheme 'Jto nullify fedcrnl cou.t't orders" by voting to cut off funds
for education above the sixth crade after Februrary l. 57
Hoffman scheduled the case for January

Judge

~G.

'Massive Resist<mce laws were struck doi;m 'by both the federal
and state courts on January 19, 1959.

The Virginia Supreme Court

of Appeals held the state was required to maintain free public
education and closing the schools was a violation of the Virginia
constitution.

Later in the day, a three-judge federal court ruled

the massive resistance laws unconstitutional, leaving only one

,~,

obstacle to open schools, the Norfolk City Council.
One day befbre Judge Hoffman ruled on Council's fund cut-off
plan, one hundred prominant businessmen of Norfolk took out an ad
in the two city newspapers, in essence appealine to the city council
to "do all within its power to open the schools" because it had
become appurent thnt segregated schools could no loneer be maintained. 59
The protest by the businessmen "broke the camel's back."

Massive

r.esist::mce was a dying issue in Virginia and Judge Hoffman's order
at the end of the month to turn funding back over to the direct
control of the school board laid to rest the last obstacle in the
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l:1ay of desegregated -schools •. Norfolk schools operied segregated ·in
a peaceful

~anner

on Februrary 2, 1959·

Segregation itself was not dead in Virginia, but it took on
a more· subtle approach.

Governor Almond appointed a commission

on the same dny the schoolc
problem in a different way.

opcw~d

in Norfolk to deal with the

The commission brought forth the

Perrow or "frccdon o:f.' choice"::Plan, letting parents decide if their
children would attend an integrated school.
not dead, i t had just gone into hiding.

No, segregation was

When and if segregation

ends altogether, whether it be ''dejure" (by law) or "de facto (by
the fact), the transition from past attitudes of racial superiority
to a "colorless" society will be complete.
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